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Calibration of Transparency Risks:
a Note∗
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Abstract
The aim of this research is to give a simple framework to evalu-
ate/quantize the transparency of a firm. We assume that the process
of the firm value is only observable once in a while but is strongly
correlated with the stock price which is observable and tradable. This
hybrid type structure make the transparency “observable”. The im-
plication of the present study is that the depth of the shock to the
market caused by the precise accounting information does reflect the
degree of transparency. Furthermore, it can be quantized resorting to
the calibration method.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Credit Risk Modeling: Literature
The models of credit risks are often classified into two groups by the degree
of details in modeling how the default occurs. In the reduced form models
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such as Jarrow-Turnbull’s [4] and Duffie-Singleton’s [2], the default is an
exogenous event, and its probabilistic nature is directly modeled in terms of
the default probability or the hazard rate, etc. On the other hand, if the
default is endogenous/set to be a consequence of some economic activities,
the model is called structural. In most structural models including Merton [8]
and Leland-Toft [7], the default occurs when the firm value process reaches
a boundary.
As Jarrow and Protter [3] pointed out, the two approaches can be unified
by introducing asymmetry between the the manager’s perspective and the
market’s. The pioneering work in this hybrid approach was done by Duffie
and Lando [1]. They assumed a default structure of Leland-Toft type which
is not directly observable to the market. This filtering approach of Duffie-
Land was generalized into the continuous time framework by Kusuoka [6]
and Nakagawa [9].
1.2 Hybrid Models and Transparency Risk
It is noteworthy that in the hybrid approach the degree of accounting trans-
parency is modeled implicitly by the difference of the manager’s perspective
and the market’s one. In fact, it is claimed in [1, p.634 l.30–32] that the shape
of the term structure of credit spreads may indeed play a useful empirical role
in estimating the degree of transparency of a firm, and in [9, p.134 l.13–15] it
is pointed out that the credit spread can be explained by the hazard rate plus
some fluctuation caused by the difference between the manager’s filtration
and the market’s one. That is to say, we have the following decomposition:
credit risk = default risk + transparency risk. (1.1)
With this view, we can say that in the structural approach only default risk
is modeled while in the reduced form approach credit risk is treated without
decomposing. The transparency risk is made visible only when one construct
a hybrid type model.
1.3 Our Motivation/Calibration
The importance of the accounting transparency is now widely recognized
among the managers as well as the investors. Of course the Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOx) Act of 2002 in U.S.A, followed by J-SOx of September 2007 in Japan,
2
was a cornerstone but they are basically aimed to reduce the transparency
risks from the investor’s perspective. The decomposition (1.1), however,
suggests that the managers can reduce the credit spread by promoting trans-
parency. It says there can be positive incentives for the manager to reduce
the transparency risks. This observation is empirically supported by the
study of Yu [10].
The problem is then how we could know the degree of transparency.
The formula of Duffie-Lando or the one by Nakagawa is too complicated to
calibrate it to the market values. We need simpler formulas but nonetheless
it should be based on a hybrid type model.
1.4 Structure of Transparency/ Slightly Incomplete Mar-
ket
Motivated by the above demand, in the present paper we will construct a
simple hybrid type model out of the classical Merton’s structural model.
Structure of transparency is modeled by “ρ-coupling” of Wiener processes.
Roughly speaking, the filtration of manager’s and market’s are generated by
two 1-dimensional Wiener processes W and W ′ starting from 0 respectively.
Here
〈W,W ′〉t = ρt (1.2)
for a constant ρ ∈ (0, 1), which is set the unique parameter describing the
transparency.
We will work on the continuous time framework but the full accounting
information (or the firm value) is supposed to be available at the discrete
set of dates t1, . . . , tn, . . .. These discrete filtration make the market “slightly
incomplete” and thus we need to be careful about the consistency with the
no-arbitrage framework.
1.5 Main Results
Under the simple hybrid model assumptions described roughly in the above,
the present study will show that
• with a proper choice of the state price density, the market value of a
firm is obtained by the image of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck semigroup,
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• the credit spread formula is explicitly obtained and it doesn’t depend
explicitly on the transparency parameter at the dates t1, . . . , tn, . . .,
• and by this property the parameter can be calibrated to the market
value.
1.6 Organization of the Rest of the Paper
In section 2.1, we shall give the setting and the market model on which we
will be working. The first result on the consistency of our market model is
given as Theorem 1. In section 2.2, presented is a result on an economic
property of our market model. Under these settings, we will obtain a generic
formula (2.3) in section 2.3. The formula is applied to evaluation of the
credit risk and transparency risk in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Proofs for those
mathematical results are given in sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
2 The Formulas
2.1 The Firm Value and the Market
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space on which a one dimensional Wiener
process {Wt} can be defined, and {Ft} be the natural filtration of W . We
assume Merton’s economy in [8]; i.e, the firm value is assumed to be
Vt := V0 exp((µ− σ
2
2
)t+ σWt), (2.1)
where µ ∈ R and σ ≥ 0.
Let T := {tk : k ∈ Z+} ⊂ R+, where t0 = 0 and tk < tk+1 for each
k ∈ Z+, be the dates of the accounting report; namely we suppose that
the firm value V is observable only at each tk ∈ T, and during the interval
(tk, tk+1) the market can only “guess” the firm value. Let
Gt := F ′t ∨ σ(Vs : s ∈ T, s ≤ t),
where F ′t is the natural filtration of W ′ which is introduced in Introduction.
Note that the joint law of W and W ′ is completely determined by (1.2).
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To be consistent with no-arbitrage framework, we set the state price den-
sity of the market by
Zt = exp(θW
′
t −
1
2
θ2t− rt),
where r is the constant interest rate and
θ := −µ− r
σρ
.
It should be noted that Zte
rt is a martingale with respect to the filtration
{G} and therefore a probability measure Q on {G} is defined by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Gt
= Zte
rt.
Our first result is the following.
Theorem 1. The “filtered” firm value process V ′t := E[Vt|Gt] defines the
no-arbitrage price with respect to the state price density Z defined above.
Namely, for tk ≤ t < tk+1, we have
V ′t = Z
−1
t E[Ztk+1Vtk+1 |Gt] = e−r(tk+1−t)EQ[Vtk+1 |Gt].
In particular, V ′t e
−rt is a Q-G- martingale.
A proof of Theorem 1 will be given in section 4.1.
Remark 2. The market value of the firm V ′ is explicitly given as
V ′t = Vtk exp((µ−
(σρ)2
2
)(t− tk)
+ σρ(W ′t −W ′tk)),
(2.2)
which is the image of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Semigroup Tu defined by setting
u = log ρ. At the dates tk, the market value of the firm V
′
tk
coincides with
the firm value Vtk . When ρ = 1, the market fully observe the firm value even
during the period (tk, tk+1).
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2.2 An Economic Interpretation of the State Price Den-
sity Z
Since we set Z to be a state price density,
C(X)t = Z
−1
t E[Ztk+1X|Gt] = e−r(tk−t)EQ[X|Gt].
gives a fair value at time t(< tk) of the cash flow X at time tk ∈ T. The
following proposition could give an economic interpretation of the process
C(X).
Proposition 3. The value C(X) is the replication cost (within the market
G ) of
K∗ := E[X|Gtk−],
which is minimizer of
inf{||KT −X||L2 : KT ∈ L2(Gtk−)},
where
Gt− := ∨s<tGs.
Namely we have, for t < tk
C(X)t = e
−r(tk−t)EQ[K∗|Gt] = e−r(tk−t)EQ[X|Gt].
A proof will be given in section 4.2.
2.3 The Generic Formulas
In this section we will obtain explicit formulas for C(X) with X = f(Vtn) for
a bounded Borel function
f : R → R.
Now, let
τσ,ρ(s) := −σ
2
2
(tn − tk)
+
(σρ)2
2
(s− tk) + r(tn − s),
νσ,ρ(s) := σ
√
(tn − tk)− ρ2(s− tk).
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Theorem 4. We have the following explicit formulas for the value C(f(Vtn)):
C(f(Vtn))t
= e−r(tn−t)
∫ ∞
−∞
f(V ′t exp{τσ,ρ(t) + zνσ,ρ(t)})
e−
z
2
2√
2pi
dz,
(tk ≤ t < tk+1 ≤ tn).
(2.3)
In particular, the expression does not contain ρ at t = tk:
C(f(Vtn))tk = e
−r(tn−tk)
1√
2pi∫ ∞
−∞
f(Vtk−1 exp(−
σ2
2
(tn − tk) + r(tn − tk) + σ
√
tn − tkz))e− z
2
2 dz.
(2.4)
A proof will be given in section 4.3.
3 Evaluation of Transparency
3.1 Default Structure and the Market Value of the
Debt
As we have stated in Introduction, for the structure of the default we rely the
Merton’s classical framework, but actually we need a deeper consideration
on the default structure and the firm value.
Let {δt : t ∈ T} be the debt structure of a firm. Here we assume that the
maturity of each debt is always in T. We also assume that the default occurs
only when and whenever the firm value Vtk is less than δtk . In particular, the
default occurs only at the dates of accounting report T. Just like Merton’s
model, we can set the pay-off of the debt to be
min(δtk , Vtk−),
and therefore the market value of the debt is given by
D
ρ,tk
t := e
−r(tk−t)EQ[min(δtk , Vtk−)
∏
l<k
1{Vt
l
−>δtl}
|Gt], (t < tk).
In this debt structure, it may be natural to assume
Vtk = Vtk− − δtk ,
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which is somehow inconsistent with (2.1). To avoid this inconsistency, we
only consider the debt with nearest maturity: δtk > 0 and δtl = 0 for l < k.
under these structural assumptions, we may consider the market value of the
firm as the total market value of the issued stock.
Furthermore, since default will never occur before the nearest maturity
tk, we obtain the following explicit formulas using Theorem 4:
D
ρ,tk
t = V
′
tΦ(α(t))
− δtke−r(tk−t)Φ(α(t) + νσ,ρ(t))
+ δtke
−r(tk−t), (tk−1 ≤ t < tk)
(3.1)
where
Φ(y) :=
∫ y
−∞
1√
2pi
e
1
2
x2dx,
α(t) :=
log
δtk
V ′
t
− τσ,ρ(t)
νσ,ρ(t)
,
and when t ∈ T in particular,
D
ρ,tk
t = V
′
tΦ(β)
− δtke−r(tk−t)Φ(β + σ
√
tk − t)
+ δtke
−r(tk−t)
(3.2)
where
β :=
log
δt
k
Vt
k−1
− (r + σ2
2
)(tk − tk−1)
σ
√
tk − tk−1 .
3.2 Discussion for Calibration
Looking at the explicit formulas (3.1) and (3.2), we notice that they depend
on the unknown parameters σ and ρ but independent of µ. Furthermore,
since the formula (3.2) does not explicitly depend on ρ (of course V ′ does
depend on ρ but this does not matter), the parameter σ can be calibrated to
the market value Dρ,tkt for t ∈ T.
Once we know the parameter σ, the formula (3.1) contains only one un-
known parameter ρ. Therefore, it can be calibrated to the market value Dρ,tkt
for t 6∈ T.
A detailed guidance of the procedure is presented in [5].
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4 Proofs and Mathematical Results
4.1 A Proof of Theorem 1
For tk ≤ t < tk+1
V ′t = Z
−1
t E[Ztk+1Vtk+1 |Gt]
= Z−1t E[E[Ztk+1Vtk+1 |Gtk−]|Gt]
= Z−1t E[Ztk+1V
′
tk+1
|Gt].
By definition we have
Ztk = Zt exp θ(W
′
tk
−W ′t )−
1
2
θ2(tk − t)− r(tk − t),
V ′tk = V
′
t exp{(µ−
(σρ)2
2
)(t− tk) + σρ(W ′tk −W ′t )},
therefore we obtain that
ZtkV
′
tk
= ZtV
′
t exp{(θ + σρ)(W ′tk −W ′t )−
1
2
(θ + σρ)2(tk − t)}
By the exponential martingale property, we obtain that
V ′t = E[Vt|Gt].
4.2 A Proof of Proposition 3
For tk ≤ t < tk+1
EQ[K∗|Gt] = E[Ztke
rtk
Ztert
K∗|Gt] = E[Ztke
rtk
Ztert
E[X|Gtk ]|Gt]
= E[E[
Ztke
rtk
Ztert
X|Gtk ]|Gt] = E[
Ztke
rtK
Ztert
X|Gt] = EQ[X|Gt].
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4.3 A Proof of Theorem 4
We calculate C(f(Vtn))t for tk ≤ t < tk+1 ≤ tn;
C(f(Vtn))t = E
Q[e−r(tn−t)f(Vtn)|Gt],
where EQ denotes the expectation with respect to equivalent martingale
measure Q.
Let us decompose W as
W = ρW ′ +
√
1− ρ2W ′′,
where W ′′ is a one dimensional Wiener process independent of W ′. Then we
have
V ′tk = V
′
t exp
(
σρ(W ′tn −W ′t ) + σ
√
1− ρ2(W ′′tn −W ′′tk)
− 1
2
σ2{(tn − tk)− ρ2(t− tk)}+ µ(tn − t)
)
= V ′t exp
(
σρ{(W ′tn −W ′t )− θ(tn − t)}+ σ
√
1− ρ2(W ′′tn −W ′′tk)
− 1
2
(νσ,ρ(t))2 + r(tn − t)
)
= V ′t exp
(
σρ{(W ′tn −W ′t )− θ(tn − t)}+ σ
√
1− ρ2(W ′′tn −W ′′tk) + τσ,ρ(t)
)
.
Since W˜ ′ := W ′t − θt is a Wiener process under Q, we have
C(f(Vtn))t = e
−r(tn−t)
EQ[f
(
V ′t exp{σρ(W˜ ′tn − W˜ ′t ) + σ
√
1− ρ2(W ′′tn −W ′′tk) + τσ,ρ(t)}
)|Gt]
=
e−r(tn−t)√
2pi
∫
R
f
(
V ′t exp{νσ,ρ(t)z + τσ,ρ(t)}
)
e−
z
2
2 dz.
The last identity holds because
σρ(W˜ ′tn − W˜ ′t) + σ
√
1− ρ2(W ′′tn −W ′′tk)
is independent of Gt and distributed as N(0, (νσ,ρ(t))2).
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